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Critical	exposition	of	Japanese	takeover	law	in	an	international	context∗			
	
	
Abstract	
	
	There	 is	 a	 common	 perception	 that	 the	 Japanese	 takeover	 market	 excludes	foreign	companies.	But	this	is	not	because	Japanese	takeover	law	is	designed	to	protect	 target	 companies.	 Comparing	 Japanese	 takeover	 law	 with	 the	 UK	Takeover	Code	and	the	European	Takeover	Directive,	this	thematic	and	content-based	 investigation	 reveals	 that	 Japan	 does	 not	 have	 overt	 anti-takeover	legislation.	There	is	no	stake-building	control	to	alert	a	target	company;	there	is	no	provision	against	virtual	bids;	post-bid	undertaking	is	not	legally	binding	on	the	bidder;	the	equivalent	of	the	mandatory	bid	under	the	UK	Takeover	Code	and	the	EU	Directive	is	set	at	a	much	higher	level	so	making	it	less	costly	for	a	bidder	to	 obtain	 corporate	 control;	 there	 is	 no	 price	 control	 to	 protect	 minority	shareholders.	 Yet	 the	 traditional	 symbiotic	 relationship	 between	 management	and	shareholders	through	cross-shareholdings	and	shareholder	perks	remains	a	major	 obstacle	 to	 a	 successful	 unsolicited	 takeover.	 Measures	 have	 been	introduced	 to	 increase	 the	 success	 of	 unsolicited	 takeover	 bids	 by	 reducing	cross-shareholdings	 through	 tax	 incentive	 measures	 and	 increasing	 board	independence	 through	a	soft-law	based	governance	code.	These	are	unlikely	 to	have	 a	 major	 impact	 on	 removing	 the	 existing	 obstacles.	 Adopting	 the	 UK	Takeover	 Code	 or	 the	 EU	Takeover	Directive	would	 not	 cure	 the	 problem	 and	would	more	likely	entrench	the	existing	situation.		
	
	
1.	The	aim	and	the	methods	used	to	set	Japan’s	takeover	regime	in	context		Japan,	 as	 the	 third-largest	 economy	 and	 second-largest	 capital	 market	 in	 the	world1,	 has	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 difficult	 market	 for	 foreign	 companies	 to	penetrate	 compared	 with	 other	 advanced	 economies. 2 	Domestically,	 the	economy’s	 slow	growth	has	 led	 to	 calls	 for	 reform	of	 its	 rigid	 structure,	which	often	 inhibits	 the	 entrepreneurial	 spirit.3	The	 aim	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 see	 if	converging	 with	 UK	 and	 EU	 takeover	 laws	 would	 permit	 more	 unsolicited	takeover	 bid.	 To	 this	 end,	 this	 paper	 uses	 Japan’s	 primary	 takeover	 law,	 the	Financial	Instrument	and	Exchange	Law	(FIE),	as	a	proxy	to	understand	Japan’s	perceived	 protectionist	 model,	 which	 is	 designed	 to	 protect	 corporate	 value,																																																									
∗	Joseph	Lee,	PhD	(London),	Senior	lecturer	in	law,	University	of	Exeter	(UK);	Visiting	Professor,	National	Taiwan	University	(Taiwan);	Principal	Investigator,	The	British	Academy	(UK).		1	With	 regard	 to	market	 capitalization,	 the	 LSE,	 the	 fourth	 largest	 capital	market	 in	 the	world,	stood	at	4.09	Trillion	GBP	in	December	2014.		2	Simon	Bytheway	 ‘Liberalisation,	 internationalisation,	and	globalization:	charting	 the	course	of	foreign	investment	in	the	finance	and	commerce	of	Japan,	1945-2009’	(2010)	22(3)	Japan	Forum	433-465;	 Ralph	 Paprzycki	 and	 Kyoji	 Fukao	 Foreign	 direct	 investment	 in	 Japan:	Multinational’s	
Role	in	Growth	and	Globalization	(CUP	Cambridge	2008).				3	Jennifer	 Amyx	 Japan’s	 Financial	 Crisis:	 Institutional	 Rigidity	 and	 Reluctant	 Change	 (2004,	Princeton	University	Press	Princeton	NJ	2004).		
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existing	 shareholders,	 stakeholders,	 and	 community	 value.4	However,	 it	 is	evident	 that	 the	 law	 itself	 does	 not	 reveal	 much	 about	 Japan’s	 protectionist	tendencies;	that	some	contextualisation	is	necessary.5	Hence,	the	article	uses	the	following	methods	to	provide	the	appropriate	context.			First,	the	paper	will	examine	the	ownership	structure	of	the	companies	listed	on	the	Tokyo	Stock	Exchange	 (TSE),	 the	 recent	changes	 to	 the	TSE	and	 the	way	 it	differs	 from	 other	 major	 markets.6	Second,	 the	 article	 will	 investigate	 Japan’s	methods	 for	 corporate	 control,	 as	measured	 by	 the	 different	methods	 used	 to	transfer	 it.	 	 Third,	 a	 thematic	 and	 content-based	 approach	 will	 be	 used	 to	examine	 the	 FIE.	 The	 themes	 examined	 will	 include	 stake-building	 control,	virtual	 bid	 control,	 commitment	 control,	 mandatory	 bids,	 and	 defensive	measures	 control.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 regulatory	 aspects	 will	 be	 discussed,	followed	 by	 a	 discussion	 of	 Japan’s	 rules	 and	 the	 implications	 of	 their	implementation.	 Other	 jurisdictions,	 notably	 the	 UK	 and	 EU,	 will	 also	 be	compared.	 Fourth,	 an	 increase	 in	 unsolicited	 takeover	 bids	 in	 recent	 years	correlates	with	 a	 decrease	 in	 cross-shareholding.	 	 The	 factors	 that	 have	 led	 to	this	 change	will	 be	 identified,	 in	 particular	 the	 growing	 participation	 of	 hedge	funds	 as	 third-party	 facilitators	 of	 takeovers	 of	 poorly	 performing	 firms	 in	corporate	Japan.7	Fifth,	Japan’s	corporate	governance	will	be	analysed	in	order	to	assess	 whether	 changes	 to	 the	 role	 of	 independent	 directors	 and	 the	 types	 of	shareholder	protection	could	allow	more	outside	and	unsolicited	takeovers.				
2.	Japan’s	capital	market	structure		Ownership	structure			Japan	has	been	regarded	as	a	capital	market	that	is	foreclosed	to	foreign	capital	regarding	the	ability	to	gain	access	and	corporate	control	of	Japanese	companies.	The	 statistics	 show	 that	 foreign	 capital	 owns	approximately	32	per	 cent	of	 the	shares	traded	on	the	Tokyo	Stock	Exchange	(TSE),	compared	with	approximately	50	 per	 cent	 on	 the	 London	 Stock	 Exchange	 (LSE).	 However,	 the	 difficulty	 in	gaining	 access	 to	 corporate	 control	 should	 not	 suggest	 a	 lack	 of	internationalisation	 in	 Japan’s	 capital	 market.8	Compared	 with	 other	 major	European	 capital	 markets,	 such	 as	 those	 of	 France,	 Germany	 and	 Italy,	 Japan	remains	 an	 attractive	 market	 for	 foreign	 investors.	 The	 holdings	 of	 Japan’s	domestic	banks	in	the	capital	market	are	approximately	23	per	cent	of	the	total																																																									4	Ulrike	Schaede	 ‘From	developmental	 state	 to	 the	 ‘New	 Japan’:	 the	strategic	 inflection	point	 in	Japanese	business’	(2012)	18(2)	Asia	Pacific	Business	Review	167-185.		5	Jonathan	 Morris,	 John	 Hassard,	 Leo	 McCann	 ‘The	 resilience	 of	 ‘institutionalised	 capitalism’:	Managing	 managers	 under	 ‘shareholder	 capitalism’	 and	 ‘managerial	 capitalism’	 (2008)	 61(5)	Human	Relations	687-710.	6	Shinhua	 Liu,	 John	 Stowe,	 Ken	Hung	 ‘Why	US	 firms	 delist	 from	 the	Tokyo	 stock	 exchange:	 An	empirical	analysis’	(2012)	24(1)	International	Review	of	Economics	&	Finance	62-70.	7	John	 Buchanan,	 Dominic	 Heesang	 Chai,	 and	 Simon	 Deakin	Hedge	Fund	Activism	in	Japan:	The	
Limits	of	Shareholder	Primacy	(CUP	Cambridge	2012).	8	Kee-hong	 bae,	 Takeshi	 Yamada,	 Keiichi	 Ito,	 ‘How	 do	 individual,	 institutional,	 and	 foreign	investors	win	and	lose	in	equity	trade?	Evidence	from	Japan’	(2006)	6(3)	International	Review	of	Finance	129-155.		
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market	 share,	 which	 is	 not	 significantly	 less	 than	 the	 amount	 held	 by	 UK	institutional	 shareholders	 in	 the	 LSE,	which	 is	 currently	 approximately	 30	 per	cent. 9 Domestic	 companies,	 not	 including	 financial	 institutions,	 hold	approximately	 22	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 market	 share	 in	 the	 TSE.	 Cross-held	shares,	 not	 common	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 US,	 are	 owned	 by	 banks	 and	 domestic	companies.	As	such,	a	block	of	almost	50	per	cent	of	shares	 in	the	total	market	acts	 as	 an	 effective	 control	 mechanism	 for	 corporate	 Japan.	 In	 addition,	individual/retail	 investor	ownership	has	decreased,	 following	the	same	path	as	the	UK,10	from	approximately	20	per	cent	in	1990	to	approximately	17	per	cent	in	2013.	The	government’s	holdings	have	remained	steady	at	a	marginal	rate	of	0.2	 per	 cent,	 compared	 with	 European	 stock	 markets’	 state	 ownership	 of	approximately	4	per	cent.11			There	 has	 also	 been	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 foreign	 ownership	 of	 Nikkei	 225	companies.	In	1990,	foreign	shareholders	owned	approximately	5	per	cent	of	the	Nikkei	225	companies,	but	by	2014,	 foreign	ownership	rose	 to	a	 staggering	32	per	cent.	This	 increase	stands	 in	sharp	contrast	 to	 the	decline	 in	ownership	by	city	 and	 regional	 banks,	 which	 coincided	 with	 Japan’s	 reform	 initiatives,	including	the	 introduction	of	 the	Securities	and	Exchange	Law,	 Japan’s	primary	takeover	legislation12,	and	efforts	by	the	government	to	buy	cross-held	shares	in	a	special	fund	that	sold	to	private	equity	firms.	Since	then,	Japan	has	experienced	a	wave	of	corporate	takeovers,	including	unsolicited	hostile	takeovers.13			The	market	for	corporate	control			The	 current	market	 for	 corporate	 control	 in	 Japan	 is	 one	of	 the	most	 active	 in	advanced	economies	as	measured	by	the	total	number	of	M&A	activities.	Before	the	 2008	 financial	 crisis,	 there	 were	 2,776	 merger	 and	 acquisition	 deals.14	In																																																									9	Office	for	National	Statistics,	UK.	Family	holdings	of	companies	in	the	UK	are	low.	See	also	Julian	Franks	and	others	 ‘Ownership:	evolution	and	Regulation’	(2003)	ECGI	–Finance	Working	Paper	No.	09/2003.	Mutual	 funds	 in	 the	UK	are	 significant	blockholders.	 See	Philip	H	Phan	and	Toru	Yoshikawa,	 ‘Corporate	 governance	 in	 Singapore:	 Developments	 and	 Prognoses’	 (Academy	 of	International	Business	Annual	Meeting,	2004).		10	UK	 individuals	owned	11.5	per	 cent	of	 the	value	of	 the	UK	stock	market	 at	 the	end	of	2010,	which	was	down	from	16.7	per	cent	in	1998.	See	Ownership	of	UK	Quoted	Shares	1998	and	2010,	Office	 for	 National	 Statistics	 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pnfc1/share-ownership---share-register-survey-report/2010/stb-share-ownership-2010.html	11	EU	Commission	Report,	Who	Owns	the	European	Economy:	Evolution	of	the	Ownership	of	EU-Listed	 Companies	 between	 1972-2012	 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/finservices-retail/docs/fsug/papers/1308-report-who-owns-european-economy_en.pdf.	 Japan	 does	 not	have	holdings	by	 government-linked	 corporations—an	economic	model	 used	 in	 Singapore	 and	other	 developing	 countries.	 For	 instance,	 26	 of	 the	 100	 largest	 firms	 listed	 on	 the	 Singapore	Exchange	(SGX)	are	controlled	to	varying	degrees	by	the	state	through	GLCs.	See	Lay	Hong	Tan,	‘Family	 Owned	 Firms	 in	 Singapore:	 Legal	 Strategies	 for	 Constraining	 Self	 dealing	 in	concentreated	ownership	structures’	(2011)	23	Singapore	Academy	of	Law	Journal	890.		12	See	Hiroshi	Oda,	The	Current	State	of	Takeover	Law	in	Japan,	(2009)	Journal	of	Business	Law.	13	See	the	statistics	in	Enrico	Colcera,	The	Market	for	Corporate	Control	in	Japan:	M&As,	Hostile	Takeovers	and	Regulatory	Framework,	(Heidelberg	2007),	pp40-51.	14	Deloitte	 ‘Deals	 and	Divestitures	 Trends	 in	 Japanese	Mergers	&	 Acquisitions’	 (October	 2014)		http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/jp/Documents/mergers-and-acquisitions/jp-ma-ma-newsletter-oct2014-en.pdf;	 A	 Metwalli	 and	 Roger	 Tang	 ‘Mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 in	Japan:	An	update’	(2013)	24(6)	Journal	of	Corporate	Accounting	&	Finance	25-34.		
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terms	of	the	number	of	takeover	bids	made,	there	are,	on	average,	70	cases	per	year15,	compared	with	the	LSE’s	average	of	115	cases	per	year.16	Japan’s	market	for	corporate	control	is	characterised	by	more	outbound	than	inbound	activities,	few	takeovers	by	foreign	investors,	and	friendly	rather	than	unsolicited,	hostile	takeovers.	One	 feature	of	 Japan’s	market	 is	 that	 there	have	been	no	 successful	foreign	takeovers—friendly	or	hostile—of	major	Japanese	companies17,	whereas	the	 UK,	 France,	 and	 the	 US	 have	 all	 experienced	 foreign	 takeovers	 of	 major	companies.	 This	 lack	 of	 internationalisation	 of	 major	 Japanese	 companies	 via	foreign	 takeovers	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 many	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 national	sentiment	 of	 retail	 investors,	 the	 rigid	 business	 practice	 of	 cross-shareholding,	and	legal	barriers.			Japan	has	a	dispersed	ownership	structure	that	 is	similar	to	that	of	 the	UK	and	other	advanced	economies	among	the	EU	member	states.	It	also	has	a	high	level	of	foreign	ownership,	which	does	not	accord	with	the	perception	of	a	foreclosed	capital	 market.	 Japan	 enjoys	 a	 high	 number	 of	 takeover	 offer	 announcements	filed	with	regulators,	which	indicates	that	there	is	a	market	for	corporate	control,	although	the	precise	merger	and	acquisition	methods	need	to	be	surveyed.			
	
																																																								15	Tokyo	Stock	Exchange	Report.	http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/investor-relations/ir-library/annual-reports/	16	UK	Takeover	Panel	Annual	Report.	http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/statements/reports	17	There	are	some	foreign	takeovers	of	smaller	Japanese	companies.			
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3.	No	apparent	anti-takeover	regulation		As	discussed,	the	increase	in	foreign	ownership	in	the	Nikkei	225	coincided	with	the	 introduction	 of	 the	 FIE,	 Japan’s	 primary	 takeover	 legislation.	 This	 paper	takes	a	thematic	approach	to	analyse	Japan’s	takeover	law,	which	consists	of	the	FIE	 and	 court-developed	 rules.	 A	 number	 of	 regulatory	 themes	 can	be	 used	 to	discern	 whether	 the	 rules	 have	 an	 anti-takeover	 effect	 and	 tendency.	 These	themes	 are	 stake-building	 control,	 virtual	 bid	 control,	 commitment	 control,	mandatory	bid	requirements,	and	finally,	control	of	defensive	measures.			
3.1	Stake-building	control	
	Stake-building	 is	a	mechanism	 for	an	acquirer	 to	acquire	control	 in	a	company	discreetly	 and	without	paying	a	 control	premium.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 target	company	 wants	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 a	 potential	 acquirer	 building	 a	 stake	 in	 the	company	so	 that	 it	can	plan	 its	defence	strategies.	These	strategies	can	 involve	bringing	 the	 acquirer	 to	 the	 negotiating	 table	 or	 thwarting	 the	 acquirer’s	 plan	before	a	takeover	becomes	imminent.	Requiring	an	acquirer	to	disclose	its	stake	in	the	company	makes	the	acquisition	process	more	transparent	and	allows	the	target	 to	 identify	 a	 potential	 acquirer	 and	 monitor	 its	 holdings.	 A	 ‘creeping	control’	provision	essentially	restricts	the	time	frame	within	which	a	person	can	obtain	 statutory	 control	 of	 a	 company.	 The	 FIE	 requires	 a	 person	 who	 holds	more	than	5	per	cent	of	the	shares	issued	by	a	listed	company,	whether	jointly	or	with	other	holders,	 to	 file	a	 ‘large	shareholding	report’	(LSR)	within	5	business	days	from	the	date	when	the	shareholding	exceeds	this	threshold.18	After	such	a	filing,	an	increase	or	decrease	by	1	per	cent	or	more	requires	an	amendment	to	be	 filed	 within	 5	 business	 days.	 These	 provisions	 result	 in	 a	 burden	 on	 a	potential	 acquirer	 and	 represent	 effective	 control	 of	 capital	 movement	 by	providing	information	that	enables	a	target	company	to	monitor	the	position	of	any	 potential	 acquirer.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 difference	 between	Japan’s	requirement	for	such	disclosure	and	those	of	the	UK	and	the	EU.	In	fact,	the	 UK’s	 Disclosure	 Rules	 and	 Transparency	 Rules	 (DTRs)	 require	 a	 more	stringent	 threshold	 of	 3	 per	 cent.19	In	 addition	 to	 the	 requirement	 that	 this	disclosure	 be	 made	 to	 the	 issuer	 company,	 the	 UK	 Companies	 Act	 2006	 also	provides	 that	 a	 company	 can	 serve	 notice	 on	 any	 person	whom	 the	 company	knows	or	has	reasonable	cause	to	believe	has	an	interest	in	the	company’s	shares	or	had	an	 interest	within	 the	 last	 three	years,	 requiring	 that	person	 to	provide	information	 on	 the	 extent	 of	 his	 or	 her	 interest.20	This	 includes	 indirect	 or	beneficial	 interests	in	shares	or	an	agreement	regarding	the	purchase	of	shares	where	parties	are	acting	in	concert.21	Where	a	person	fails	to	comply	with	such	a	notice,	 they	 commit	 an	 offence	 under	 the	 Act.22	In	 addition,	 the	 company	may	apply	 for	 an	 order	 from	 the	 Court	 restricting	 the	 rights	 attached	 to	 the	 non-																																																								18	The	FIE,	Article	27-2.1.1-6.	19	The	Disclosure	Rules	and	Transparency	Rules,	DTRs	5.1.2.	20	UK	Companies	Act	2006,	s793.	21	UK	Companies	Act	2006,	s	820.	22	UK	Companies	Act	2006,	s	794.	
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complying	 person’s	 shares,	 and	 such	 restrictions	may	 include	 a	 restriction	 on	voting	rights.23	In	contrast,	Japan	does	not	provide	such	an	equivalent	power	to	the	 target	 company.	 The	 disenfranchisement	 of	 non-disclosed	 shares	 was	specifically	ruled	out	by	the	Cabinet	Office	in	Japan	on	a	technical	ground.24	It	is	possible	that	a	person	who	plans	a	stake-building	effort	may	fail	to	disclose	the	required	 information,	 either	 intentionally	 or	 unintentionally.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	target	would	have	no	way	of	knowing	about	any	on-going	stake-building	 in	the	company	by	the	bidder	alone	or	acting	in	concert.	In	some	countries,	the	central	securities	depository	(CSD)	holds	information	about	the	identity	of	shareholders.	The	 Japan	 Securities	 Depository	 Center	 (JASDEC),	 Japan’s	 CSD,	 only	 notifies	 a	company	of	its	register	of	members	on	record	dates25.	Furthermore,	as	shares	of	Japanese	issuers	are	mostly	held	by	custodian	banks	(trust	banks),	the	names	of	the	 custodian	banks,	 rather	 than	 the	end	 investors26,	 appear	on	 the	 company’s	register	 of	members.	 Thus,	 a	 target	 company	 cannot	 easily	 detect	 and	 identify	stake-building	 by	 a	 potential	 predator.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 regulatory	 control	 on	stake-building,	 Japan	provides	 less	 information	and	power	to	a	target	company	to	detect,	monitor,	and	defend	a	creeping	takeover	by	an	acquirer	than	the	UK.	The	EU	directive	provides	no	regulations	on	stake-building	control.				
3.2	Virtual	bid	control			A	virtual	bid	describes	a	situation	when	a	bidder	engages	with	a	target	company	in	 making	 an	 offer	 to	 purchase	 shares	 in	 the	 company.	 It	 has	 the	 effect	 of	diverting	the	attention	of	the	target	company,	and	if	the	period	is	prolonged,	the	uncertainty	that	results	can	lead	to	a	substantial	cost	for	the	target	company.	The	UK	Takeover	 Code	 also	 protects	 a	 target	 company	 from	being	 hindered	 in	 the	conduct	of	its	business	by	a	bid	for	a	longer	period	than	is	reasonable.27	In	2010,	the	UK	introduced	rules	in	the	Takeover	Code	to	control	virtual	bids.	The	control	mechanism	 is	 built	 on	 two	 important	 pillars	 that	 work	 together—the	 target’s	responsibility	 to	 make	 an	 announcement	 and	 the	 put-up-or-shut-up	 rule	(‘PUSU’).28	The	 designated	 responsibility	 of	 the	 target	 company	 to	 make	 an	announcement	 gives	 it	 the	 power	 to	 control	 the	 timing	 of	 a	 bid	 and	 bring	 the	bidding	process	to	an	early	end	if	the	bidder	is	not	prepared	to	make	a	firm	bid.	An	announcement	by	the	target	triggers	a	28-day	period	for	the	bidder	to	make	a	firm	offer.	 If	 the	bidder	 chooses	not	 to	make	 a	 firm	offer,	 it	 is	 foreclosed	 from	making	 another	bid	 for	 the	next	 12	months.	 Thus,	 virtual	 bid	 control	 provides	considerable	power	to	a	target	company	by	imposing	a	tight	28-day	deadline	on																																																									23	UK	Companies	Act	2006,	s	797(1)(b).		24	The	Cabinet	Office	rejected	the	proposal	for	such	disenfranchisement	because	the	law-making	power	belonged	to	the	Ministry	of	Justice	rather	than	the	Ministry	of	Economy,	Trade	and	Industry	(METI).		25	JASDEC	also	notifies	the	company	of	the	identity	of	particular	shareholders	who	will	exercise	their	minority	rights	to	the	company.	26	The	5	%	disclosure	rule	above	also	applies	to	those	who	hold	shares	under	custody’s	names.		27	General	Principle	6	of	the	Takeover	Code.		28	City	Code	on	Takeovers	and	Mergers,	Rule	2.4.	Additionally,	for	comments	on	the	deadline,	see	Helia	Ebrahimi,	Takeover	Panel	to	Review	‘Cadbury	Law’ (21	October	2012),	The	 Telegraph,	 available	 at	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/9624417/Takeover-Panel-to-review-	Cadbury-law.html.	
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the	 bidder.	 The	 effect	 is	 that	 unless	 the	 bidder	 has	 prepared	 the	 necessary	resources,	the	target	can	use	its	announcement	power	to	bring	a	takeover	battle	to	an	early	end	by	forcing	the	bidder	to	confirm	its	intention	to	make	a	bid.29	This	mechanism	also	eliminates	the	potential	threat	from	a	bidder	because	the	bidder	cannot,	 alone	 or	 acting	 in	 concert,	 make	 another	 takeover	 bid	 for	 12	months.	Hence,	the	PUSU	rules	can	act	as	a	control	on	the	movement	of	capital	or	a	cost	to	a	bidder.	Currently,	there	is	no	such	control	in	the	EU	takeover	regime.	In	Japan,	the	responsibility	for	making	an	announcement	rests	with	the	bidder,	and	there	is	 no	 equivalent	 to	 the	 PUSU	 regime.	 The	 FIE	 requires	 a	 bidder	 to	 make	 an	announcement	 by	 serving	 a	 public	 notice	 in	 the	 Official	 Gazette	 or	 in	 daily	newspapers.	 On	 the	 same	 day	 as	 the	 announcement,	 the	 bidder	 must	 file	 a	bidder’s	statement	with	regulators.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	the	bidder’s	duty	to	state	the	duration	of	the	takeover	bid,	which	is	usually	between	20	and	60	days.	The	effect	 is	 that	 a	 bidder	has	more	 time	 to	 engage	 in	negotiations	with	 the	 target	board	 and	 has	 the	 power	 to	 set	 the	 time	 frame.	 During	 such	 negotiations,	 the	bidder	 has	 time	 to	 conduct	 its	 due	 diligence	 as	 well	 as	 to	 make	 other	preparations	for	the	bid,	such	as	stock	pricing.	The	lack	of	control	on	a	virtual	bid	in	Japan	means	that	there	is	 less	of	a	burden	on,	and	cost	to,	the	bidder;	hence,	Japan’s	framework	provides	more	favourable	conditions	for	a	takeover	than	the	UK’s	regime.			
3.3	Commitment	control			There	is	increasing	concern	about	a	bidder’s	treatment	of	a	business	after	taking	over.	In	the	UK,	a	bidder	must	disclose	its	intended	plan	for	the	business,	which	has	a	binding	effect	on	the	company.30	The	plan	must	include	the	repercussions	on	employment,	the	location	of	the	offeree	company’s	place	of	business,	plans	for	the	 redeployment	 of	 fixed	 assets	 and	 the	maintenance	 of	 any	 existing	 trading	facilities	for	shares.31		The	post-takeover	business	plan	was	a	new	requirement	introduced	after	the	US	company	Kraft’s	takeover	of	the	UK	company	Cadbury.	The	Panel	issued	a	post-takeover	 statement	 of	 criticism	 that	 asserted	 that	 statements	 made	 by	 Kraft	regarding	 the	 relocation	 of	 production	 after	 the	 takeover	 did	 not	 meet	 the	standards	of	the	Code.32	Cadbury	was	planning	to	move	its	production	facilities	to	Poland,	and	Kraft	stated	that	it	believed	that	this	move	would	not	occur	until	the	latter	part	of	2010	and	claimed	that	it	would	continue	to	operate	the	existing	production	facility	(Somerdale	facility)	for	products	sold	in	the	UK.	However,	the	factory	 facility	 in	Somerdale	was	 in	 fact	 transferred	 to	Poland	 in	 the	middle	of	2010.	 The	 Executive	 of	 the	 Panel	 held	 that	 Kraft’s	 statement	 was	 not	 a	
																																																								29	The	PUSU	rule	was	effectively	applied	in	the	case	of	Pfizer’s	potential	hostile	takeover	of	AstraZeneca.	The	latter	target	board’s	insistent	rejection	of	all	potential	offers	and	discussions	by	the	former	company	up	until	the	PUSU	deadline	gave	Pfizer	little	room	but	to	‘shut	up’.		30	Blanaid	 Clarke,	 ‘Reviewing	 Takeover	 Regulation	 in	 the	 Wake	 of	 the	 Cadbury	 Acquisition	Regulation	in	a	Twirl’, (2011)	3	Journal	of	Business	Law,	300.	31	City	Code	on	Takeovers	and	Mergers,	Rules	24.2	and	25.1.	32	City	Code	on	Takeovers	and	Mergers,	Rule	19.1.	
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reasonable	belief	using	an	objective	test.	However,	it	is	not	clear	what	sanctions	the	Panel	can	impose	to	enforce	such	a	commitment.33			In	 Japan,	a	bidder	must,	 in	 its	TOB	statement,	describe	any	plans	 for	corporate	reorganisations,	material	borrowings,	changes	in	member	composition,	changes	in	the	composition	of	officers,	material	changes	in	the	dividend	or	capital	policy,	and	changes	in	management	policies.34	The	bidder	must	state	whether	the	shares	are	likely	to	be	de-listed	after	the	takeover	and,	 if	so,	must	provide	the	reasons	for	 that	action.	The	bidder	must	not	give	 false	statements	with	regard	 to	 these	matters.	 A	 false	 statement	 can	 lead	 to	 civil	 liability	 for	 damages,	 fines	 and	imprisonment.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 details	 required	 in	 the	 TOB	 statement,	 the	target	board	can	also	request	similar	information	from	a	bidder.	Under	the	FIE,35	the	 target	must	 file	 an	 ‘Opinion	 Report’—to	 reject	 or	 accept	 a	 bid—within	 10	days	after	the	bidder	has	filed	its	TOB	statement.	In	the	board’s	Opinion	Report,	the	 board	 can	make	more	 detailed	 enquiries	 of	 the	 bidder	 regarding	 its	 post-takeover	 business	 plan.	 The	 bidder	 must	 file	 an	 ‘Answer	 Report’	 within	 5	business	 days	 after	 the	 target’s	 filing.36	However,	 the	 bidder	 does	 not	 have	 an	obligation	 to	make	a	 full	 and	detailed	disclosure	and	can	 intentionally	keep	 its	answers	broad	and	vague.			Unlike	 the	UK	 regulation’s	 strict	 binding	 effect	 on	 the	 bidder,	 there	 is	 no	 such	legal	effect	of	this	statement	under	the	FIE.	The	bidder	does	not	need	to	honour	what	 is	 said	 in	 the	 statement	 if	 the	 circumstances	 require	 it	 to	 change	 course	from	 its	 plans	 disclosed	 in	 the	 statement.	 Compared	 with	 the	 UK’s	 approach,	Japan	does	not	 impose	a	 legal	duty	on	a	bidder	to	commit	to	 its	plan.	The	UK’s	approach,	although	it	cannot	be	said	to	have	a	protectionist	tendency,	imposes	a	higher	cost	on	the	bidder	than	what	is	required	in	Japan.	The	EU	Directive	does	not	regulate	information	on	post-takeover	business	plans.			 		
3.4	Mandatory	bid		
	
	The	 purpose	 of	 a	 mandatory	 bid	 is	 multifaceted,	 and	 the	 context	 must	 be	analysed	 to	 discern	 the	 aims	 of	 such	 a	 regulation.	 A	 mandatory	 bid	 normally	describes	 an	obligation	of	 the	bidder	 to	make	 an	offer	 to	purchase	 shares	 in	 a	target	 company	when	 or	 immediately	 before	 the	 bidder’s	 holding	 surpasses	 a	certain	threshold.	Broadly	speaking,	the	aim	is	to	ensure	equal	treatment	of	the	shareholders	 of	 the	 target	 company.	 In	 addition,	 a	 ‘control	 premium’	must	 be	paid	by	 the	bidder	 and	distributed	 to	 the	 existing	 shareholders.	Without	 these	two	 conceptual	 underpinnings	 of	 shareholder	 protection	 supporting	 the	mandatory	 bid	 requirement,	 a	 mandatory	 bid	 would	 simply	 act	 as	 an	extraordinary	burden	on	and	cost	to	a	bidder.	This	very	high	cost	imposed	on	a	bidder	can	act	as	a	control	on	the	movement	of	capital	and	essentially	serves	as	a	protectionist	measure	in	disguise.	There	has	been	ongoing	debate	and	extensive																																																									33	City	Code	on	Takeovers	and	Mergers,	Rules	19.7,	19.8	and	24.2.		34	The	FIE,	Article	27-9.	35	The	FIE,	Article	27-10-1,2.	36	The	FIE,	Article	27-10-11.	
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discussion	 regarding	whether	 the	 US	model	 of	 non-mandatory	 bids	 or	 the	 UK	and	 EU	 model	 of	 mandatory	 bids	 increases	 corporate	 performance,	 investor	protection,	 and	 capital	 market	 efficiency.	 Japan’s	 mandatory	 bid	 regulation	presents	 a	 very	 different	 story.	 Japan	 requires	 a	 bidder	 to	make	 an	 actual	 bid	before	crossing	the	threshold	of	30	per	cent	shareholding	of	the	target.37	This	ex	
ante	 requirement	 is	 different	 from	 the	 UK’s	 ex	post	 requirement.38	The	 aim	 of	Japan’s	 mandatory	 bid	 regulation	 is	 to	 ensure	 transparency	 in	 the	 transfer	 of	control	of	a	company	so	 that	 the	board	of	 the	 target	company,	 the	market,	and	the	 regulators	 are	 notified	 of	 such	 a	 change	 in	 control.	 The	 two	 conceptual	underpinnings	 of	 shareholder	 protection	 regarding	 mandatory	 bids	 in	 the	 UK	and	EU	do	not	form	the	foundation	for	Japan’s	ex	ante	30	per	cent	mandatory	bid	requirement.	The	remaining	shareholders	do	not	receive	a	control	premium	paid	by	 the	 bidder,	 as	 the	 mandatory	 bid	 does	 not	 require	 the	 bidder	 to	 make	 a	mandatory	purchase	of	the	remaining	shares.	In	fact,	a	partial	bid	can	be	made.	Another	 anomaly	 is	 that	 in	 Japan,	 a	mandatory	 bid	 is	 only	 required	when	 the	transaction	 is	made	off	 the	market.	On-market	purchases	 are	 exempt	 from	 the	mandatory	bid	requirement39,	which	raises	the	question	of	why	this	exemption	applies.	 In	 contrast,	 the	UK	and	EU	mandatory	bid	 requirements	apply	 to	both	on-the-market	and	off-	market	purchases.	An	explanation	 for	 this	exemption	 is	that	 purchasing	 a	 30	 per	 cent	 holding	 on	 the	 market	 is	 more	 expensive	 than	doing	so	off	 the	market.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	purchase,	unless	 through	stake-building,	a	30	per	cent	holding	on	the	market.	The	transfer	of	such	a	degree	of	control	of	a	company	can	be	more	easily	performed	through	an	off-the-market	purchase.	However,	the	transfer	of	30	per	cent	control	does	not	effectively	lead	to	 control	 of	 the	 acquired	 company	 because	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 board	directors	 still	 requires	 shareholder	 approval	 by	more	 than	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 the	total	 shares.	 At	 best,	 a	 30	 per	 cent	 holder	 can	 appoint	 some	 directors	 to	 the	board.	 This	 exemption	 substantially	 removes	 the	 cost	 to	 the	 bidder	 imposed	under	 the	UK	and	EU	models	when	acquiring	control	of	a	company	through	an	on-	market	 purchase.	 In	 other	words	 and	 in	 theory,	 an	 acquirer	 can	 purchase	shares	 in	a	 target	company	and	acquire	control	by	obtaining	more	than	50	per	cent	of	the	shares	on	the	market	without	making	a	mandatory	bid.	However,	the	foregoing	does	not	support	 the	suggestion	 that	 Japan’s	mandatory	bid	rule	 is	a	disguised	protectionist	measure.	Furthermore,	 Japan	adheres	 to	 the	one-share-one-vote	 principle	 in	 which	 major	 shareholders	 cannot	 out-vote	 others	 by	exercising	 special	 voting	 rights.	Therefore,	 Japan	does	not	need	 the	EU	 type	of	breakthrough	 rule	 to	 resolve	 special	 voting	 rights	 issues	 that	 can	 act	 as	 an	obstacle	to	a	takeover.			There	 is	 another	 mandatory	 bid	 requirement	 under	 the	 FIE.	 Once	 a	 person	acquires	more	than	75	per	cent	of	a	target’s	outstanding	shares,	a	mandatory	bid	must	 be	 made.40	This	 mechanism	 essentially	 represents	 a	 bidder’s	 buy-out	obligation	 and	 the	 existing	 shareholders’	 sell-out	 rights.	 A	 partial	 bid	 is	 not																																																									37	The	threshold	is	provided	by	the	Ordinance	14-2-2	under	Article	27-13-4	of	the	FIE.	38	Tomotaka	Fujita	‘The	Takeover	Regulation	in	Japan:	Peculiar	Developments	in	the	Mandatory	Offer	Rule’	(2011)	No3	UTSoft	Law	Review	24-41.	39	However,	after-hours	on	the	market	transactions	made	through	ToSTNet	and	J-Net	are	not	exempted.	See	FIE,	Article	27-2-.13.	40	The	FIE,	Article	27-13-4.		
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allowed;	however,	there	is	no	regulation	of	the	offering	price.	Thus,	a	bidder	can	make	 a	mandatory	bid	below	 the	market	price.	A	75	per	 cent	 shareholder	has	more	 than	 effective	 control	 of	 a	 company,	 and	 such	 a	mandatory	 bid	 does	 not	serve	the	purpose	of	offering	a	control	premium	to	the	remaining	shareholders,	nor	 does	 it	 serve	 as	 a	 substantial	 protection	 to	 them.	 Had	 there	 been	 a	 price	control	on	the	offer—such	as	the	highest	price	at	which	the	bidder	has	acquired	shares	 in	 the	 past	 few	months—this	mandatory	 requirement	 could	 serve	 as	 a	measure	 to	 protect	 the	 remaining	 shareholders.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 this	 price	control	 element,	 however,	 this	 requirement	 effectively	 provides	 a	 convenient	tool	for	a	bidder	to	obtain	full	control	without	incurring	a	high	cost	for	minority	shareholder	protection.			A	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	these	findings	is	that	the	30	per	cent	and	75	per	cent	mandatory	bid	requirements	do	not	represent	a	more	substantial	cost	to	the	bidder	than	the	mandatory	bid	requirements	under	the	UK	and	EU	models.	Mandatory	 bids	 in	 Japan	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 protectionist	measures	 in	 disguise	against	 a	 takeover	 bid;	 they	 only	 restrict	 the	 opportunities	 of	 minority	shareholders	to	benefit	from	a	takeover.	Because	transfers	of	control	often	take	place	within	a	corporate	group	of	companies,	the	30	per	cent	ex	ante	rule	serves	as	a	 transparency	measure.	When	such	 information	 is	disclosed,	an	outsider	 to	the	group	can	make	an	unsolicited	bid.				
3.5	Defensive	measures		
	With	regards	to	the	most	debated	area	of	defensive	measures,	Japan’s	system	is	no	more	of	an	innovative	legal	design	than	the	frameworks	in	the	UK,	the	EU	or	the	US.	 The	UK’s	 non-frustration	 rule	 vests	 the	 power	 to	 raise	 defences	 in	 the	shareholders.	 The	 power	 of	 management	 to	 use	 defences	 as	 a	 protectionist	measure	 or	 as	 a	 genuine	 tool	 to	 protect	 shareholders	 from	 being	 coerced	 to	accept	an	under-valued	offer	has	been	greatly	diminished	by	the	non-frustration	rule.	 Increasingly,	 the	non-frustration	rule	benefits	short-term-focused	investor	groups,	 such	 as	 hedge	 funds	 and	 private	 equity	 firms.	 The	 activities	 of	 these	entities	 are	 vital	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 City	 of	 London	 as	 the	 world	 financial	centre.	By	contrast,	the	EU’s	opt-out	rule	continues	to	allow	companies	to	raise	defences.	To	level	the	playing	field,	the	reciprocal	rule,	if	opted-in	by	the	member	state,	 can	 be	 used	 by	 companies	 to	 raise	 defences	 against	 a	 takeover	 by	 a	company	 from	a	country	without	such	a	non-frustration	rule.	 Japan	has	 largely	adopted	the	Delaware	approach	based	on	the	Unocal	case41.	Under	the	Japanese	approach42,	 the	 board	 has	 the	 power	 to	 raise	 defences	 to	 protect	 corporate	value. 43 	The	 term	 ‘corporate	 value’	 was	 subsequently	 interpreted	 in	 a																																																									41	Unocal	Corp.	v.	Mesa	Petroleum	Co.,	493	A.2d	946	(Del.	1985).	42	In	NBS	v	Livedoor,	the	court	has	developed	the	case	law	by	interpreting	‘unfair	issue	of	shares/	share	option’	in	ruling	whether	or	not	poison	pills	used	may	be	unfair	under	company	law	provisions	so	as	to	allow	shareholders	of	the	company	to	obtain	injunction	of	the	issue	under	the	Articles	210	and	247	of	the	Companies	Act.		43	D.	Hugh	Whittaker	and	Masaru	Hayakawa,	‘Contesting	“Corporate	Value”	Through	Takeover	Bids	in	Japan’	(2007)	15(1)	Corporate	Governance	16-26.			
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government-commissioned	report	by	a	study	group	as	the	monetary	interests	of	existing	shareholders.44	This	‘business	judgement	rule’	does	not	allow	the	board	to	use	defences	to	protect	a	board-favoured	takeover	deal	even	in	the	interest	of	the	 company.	 As	 in	 the	 NBS	 case45,	 the	 court	 ruled	 against	 the	 defence	 of	 a	shareholder	rights	plan	(a	‘poison	pill’)	that	the	target	company’s	board	adopted	to	protect	a	takeover	bid	made	by	its	own	subsidiary.	The	target	board	believed	that	such	a	takeover	bid	by	its	own	subsidiary	would	benefit	the	target	company	by	 creating	 more	 business	 synergies.	 This	 case	 demonstrates	 that	 even	 in	 a	takeover	 within	 a	 corporate	 group,	 the	 courts	 had	 no	 problem	 ruling	 out	 any	measures	 that	 would	 prevent	 an	 outsider	 from	 acquiring	 control	 of	 an	 entity	within	that	corporate	group.	Similarly,	 in	the	famous	Bull-Dog	Sauce	case46,	the	Tokyo	 Supreme	 Court	 further	 confirmed	 the	 shareholder	 primacy	 rule	 and	allowed	a	defence	raised	by	the	target	board	against	an	active	US	private	equity	fund.	 In	allowing	 the	defence,	 the	Supreme	Court	reasoned	 that	 the	rights	plan	was	approved	by	an	overwhelming	majority	of	 the	shareholders	at	 the	general	meeting.	It	disagreed	with	the	rulings	by	the	Tokyo	District	Court	and	the	Tokyo	High	Court.	Both	lower	courts	focused	more	on	the	conduct	of	the	bidder—both	specifically	 in	 this	 takeover	 and	more	 generally	 regarding	 the	 business	model	and	strategy	of	Steel	Partners.	Specifically,	Steel	Partners	had	refused	to	disclose	its	post-takeover	business	plan	as	requested	by	the	target	board	 in	the	target’s	‘Opinion	 Report’.	 More	 generally,	 Steel	 Partners	 had	 acquired	 an	 infamous	reputation	for	not	respecting	the	Japanese	value	of	corporate	community—that	is,	 requiring	 that	 management	 focus	 on	 the	 corporate	 long-term	 vision	 as	opposed	to	short-term	gain.	Japan’s	system	is	no	more	legally	uncertain	than	that	of	Delaware	or	an	EU	member	state	opting	out	of	 the	non-frustration	rule.	The	Tokyo	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	is	effectively	a	non-frustration	rule.	The	question	is	why	shareholders	would	approve	defensive	measures	both	pre-bid	and	post-bid.	 The	 more	 interesting	 aspect,	 however,	 is	 how	 companies	 use	 pre-bid	defences	to	monitor	the	potential	threat	of	a	takeover.			Japanese	 companies	often	adopt	 a	pre-warning	 type	of	defence	 that	 requires	 a	bidder	 to	 comply	with	 the	 target’s	 demands.47	The	 target	 company	 can	 issue	 a	notice	requesting	that	a	suspected	bidder	observe	the	procedure	designed	by	the	target.	Such	a	notice	is	normally	issued	even	before	a	bid	becomes	imminent,	for	instance,	when	 a	 person’s	 shareholding	 passes	 the	 15	 per	 cent	 threshold.	 The	bidder	 can	be	 required	 to	disclose	 its	 acquisition	plan	 and	 submit	 information	such	 as	 a	 business	 plan.	 If	 the	 suspected	 bidder	 fails	 to	 comply	 with	 the	procedure	imposed	by	the	target,	that	failure	can	trigger	a	rights	plan	that	allows	the	company	 to	 issue	shares	 to	 its	members	and	exclude	 the	suspected	bidder.	Such	a	defence	gives	the	target	the	power	to	monitor	any	potential	threat	and	to	control	a	 ‘virtual	bid’.	 It	 is	also	a	power	given	to	the	target	board	to	repeatedly	request	 information	 from	a	potential	 bidder.	 This	 pre-warning	 type	of	 defence																																																									44	Masatsugu	Yoshioka	 ‘A	comparative	critique	of	cash-out	mergers	in	Japan	and	the	US’	(2005)	5(2)	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	Studies	465-506.		45	NBS	v.	Livedoor,	1899	Hanrei	Jihô	56	(Tokyo	High	Court,	March	23,	2005).	46	Bull	Dog	Sauce	v.	Steel	Partners	2007	Tokyo	Supreme	Court,	Case	No.	2007	(Kyo)	30	47	For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 its	 use,	 see	Appendix	 C	 ‘Advance	Warning	 Poison	Pill’	 in	 Encrio	Colcera	 The	 Market	 For	 Corporate	 Control	 in	 Japan:	 M&As,	 Hostile	 Takeovers	 and	 Regulatory	
Framework	(Springer	Heidelberg	2007).	
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involves	 a	 rights	 plan	 that	 authorises	 the	 board	 to	 issue	 shares,	 usually	 in	 the	form	of	share	options,	once	certain	conditions	have	been	met.	Such	a	defence	is	not	used	in	the	UK	and	EU,	as	the	issuance	of	share	capital	is	more	restricted.	The	UK	and	EU	require	shareholder	approval	for	an	allotment	of	shares.	The	UK,	for	instance,	 requires	 that	 the	 board’s	 authority	 to	 allot	 shares	 be	 approved	 and	renewed	every	 five	years.	However,	 in	practice,	 as	 recommended	by	 insurance	and	 pension	 groups,	 this	 authority	 is	 renewed	 every	 year.	 Japan	 has	 no	 law	requiring	 the	 board	 to	 obtain	 such	 shareholder	 approval.	 However,	 many	companies	voluntarily	obtain	shareholder	approval	of	a	rights	plan	for	a	period	of	3	years	or,	 in	some	cases,	1	year.	 In	the	2014	amendment	to	Companies	Act,	where	 as	 a	 result	 of	 new	 issuance	 of	 shares	 or	 share	 options	 a	 subscriber	 is	expected	 to	 hold	 a	 majority	 of	 all	 the	 issued	 shares	 of	 the	 company,	 all	 the	existing	 shareholders	 are	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 to	 disagree	 on	 the	 new	issuance	 to	 the	 subscriber.48		When	 the	 percentage	 of	 dissenting	 shareholders	reaches	 10	 per	 cent,	 a	 shareholder	 meeting	 must	 be	 held	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	shareholders’	 approval.49	The	 question	 is	 why	 shareholders	 approve	 such	defences.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 no	 shareholder	 pre-emption	 right	 in	 Japan50.	Hence,	 shareholders	do	not	 receive	 an	 immediate	monetary	 gain	under	 such	 a	rights	 plan.	 There	 are	 an	 increasing	number	 of	 cases	where	 shareholders	 vote	down	the	board’s	proposal	to	adopt	defensive	measures.	The	factors	influencing	such	 changes	 in	 attitude	 amongst	 shareholder	 groups	 should	 be	 further	investigated.		
	
	These	regulatory	aspects	align	with	 the	regulatory	 themes	contained	 in	 the	EU	Takeover	 Directive	 and	 the	 UK	 Takeover	 Code.	 The	 courts	 have	 developed	rules—largely	 following	 the	 Delaware	Revlon	 approach—to	 prevent	 the	 board	from	 abusing	 its	 power	 by	 adopting	 poison	 pills	 when	 faced	 with	 a	 hostile	takeover	bid.	However,	a	detailed	examination	of	the	FIE	will	reveal	that	some	of	the	 rules	 do	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 discouraging	 unsolicited/hostile	 takeover	 bids.	These	 rules	must	 also	 be	 read	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 symbiotic	 relationships	between	 boards	 and	 shareholders.	 These	 relationships	 have	 been	 created	through	 cross-shareholding	 with	 corporate	 shareholders	 and	 through	shareholder	perks	with	retail	shareholders.51	
	
	
	
4.	Decreasing	cross-shareholding	as	a	‘breakthrough’	for	takeovers		
	
	
4.1	Decreasing	cross-shareholding																																																										48	Companies	Act,	Article	206-2.	49	Companies	Act,	Article	244-2.		50	The	law	allows	the	companies	to	do	so	on	a	voluntary	basis	under	Article	202	of	the	Companies	Act.	In	the	UK,	a	pre-emption	right	is	no	longer	mandatory	in	private	companies.	There	is	an	on-going	debate	about	the	wisdom	of	such	a	right	for	the	shareholders	in	listed	companies.		51	Toru	 Yoshikawa,	 Philip	 Phan	 ‘Alternative	 corporate	 governance	 systems	 in	 Japanese	 firms:	implications	for	a	shift	to	stockholder-centered	corporate	governance’	(2001)	18(2)	Asia	Pacific	Journal	of	Management	183-205.		
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	Cross-shareholding	 refers	 to	 two	 types	 of	 symbiotic	 relationship	 between	investors	and	management.52	The	first	refers	to	banks	investing	in	companies	in	return	 for	 obtaining	 business,	 such	 as	 selling	 insurance	 policies	 or	 managing	pension	funds,	but	does	not	involve	companies	holding	shares	in	the	banks	that	also	 hold	 their	 shares.53	The	 second	 type	 of	 relationship	 is	 where	 companies	invest	 in	 each	 another	 to	 obtain	 mutual	 support.	 Until	 recently,	 cross-shareholding	 constituted	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 shareholding	 of	 most	 of	 the	listed	 Japanese	 companies.	 Cross-shareholdings	 create	 a	 soft	 alliance	whereby	there	is	a	tacit	understanding,	as	opposed	to	a	formal	contract,	that	votes	should	be	 exercised	 according	 to	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 board.	 In	 a	 takeover,	institutional	 and	 corporate	 shareholders	 who	 accept	 a	 hostile	 tender	 offer	 or	vote	 against	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 board	 suffer	 reputational	 damage—which	 is	 a	 vital	 asset	 for	 doing	 business	 in	 Japan.	 An	 insurance	 company,	 as	 a	result	 of	 not	 following	 the	 board’s	 decisions	 in	 a	 takeover,	 would	 lose	 their	opportunity	 to	obtain	business	 from	 the	 target	 company	as	well	 as	 from	other	companies	that	believe	in	this	‘value’.	Cross-shareholding	is	therefore	a	non-legal	means	 to	 control	 the	 movement	 of	 capital.54	Through	 it,	 shareholders	 can	 be	mobilised	to	successfully	fend	off	a	takeover	bid.	Therefore,	a	decrease	in	cross-shareholding	 in	 Japan	 should	 change	 the	 voting	 pattern	 of	 shareholders	 in	general	meetings.	It	can	also	increase	the	movement	of	capital,	which	in	turn	can	lead	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 shareholders.	 When	 such	 changes	 in	shareholder	composition	eventually	diminish	cross-shareholdings,	there	will	be	an	 increased	 number	 of	 successful	 unsolicited	 takeovers.	 Changing	 Japan’s	takeover	 law	 to	 accord	with	 UK	 or	 EU	 norms	would	 not	 decrease	 the	 level	 of	cross-shareholdings	in	Japanese	companies.			The	 experience	 in	 Japan	 shows	 that	 economic	 and	 legal	 measures	 can	 be	introduced	 to	 reduce	 cross-shareholdings55.	 A	 requirement	 to	 increase	 banks’	equity	ratio	can	achieve	this	end.	Enforcing	fiduciary	duties	to	prompt	the	board	to	dispose	of	under-valued	cross-holdings	is	another	method.	However,	the	latter	would	 require	 a	 more	 solid	 legal	 argument	 to	 counter-balance	 the	 business	judgement	rule	that	favours	the	board’s	investment	discretion.	The	government	could	also	use	its	taxing	power	to	decrease	the	level	of	cross-holdings	by	cutting	the	 corporate	 capital	 gains	 tax	 to	 incentivise	 the	 disposal	 of	 these	 shares	 by	companies.	 The	 competition	 law	 could	 also	 be	 used	 to	 break	 up	 these	 soft	alliances.	 Although	 reducing	 the	 level	 of	 corporate	 cross-shareholdings	 and	breaking	up	these	soft	alliances	could	provide	more	space	for	the	free	movement	of	capital,	the	massive	sale	of	these	shares	would	create	a	high	supply	of	shares																																																									52	Takaya	Seki	‘Legal	reform	and	shareholder	activism	by	institutional	investors	in	Japan’	(2005)	13(3)	Corporate	Governance	377-385.	53	F	Hayashi	‘The	main	bank	system,	and	corporate	investment:	An	empirical	reassessment’	in	M	Aoki	 and	G	 Saxonhouse	Finance,	Governance,	and	Competitiveness	in	Japan	 (Oxford:	OUP	2000);	Wenlian	 Gao	 ‘Banks	 as	 lenders	 and	 shareholders:	 Evidence	 from	 Japan’	 (2008)	 16(4)	 Pacific-Basin	Finance	Journal	389-410.		54	David	Weinstein	and	Yishay	Yafeh	‘On	the	costs	of	a	bank-centered	financial	system:	Evidence	from	the	changing	main	banks	relations	in	Japan’	(1998)	53(2)	Journal	of	finance	635-672.	55	Under	Article	308	of	 the	Companies	Act,	 if	company	A	holds	at	 least	one	 fourth	of	 the	 issued	shares	of	the	company	B,	company	B	cannot	exercise	its	voting	right	at	shareholder	meetings	of	company	A.		
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without	 a	matching	 level	 of	 demand,	 which	would	 result	 in	 a	 plunge	 in	 share	prices.	Another	way	of	regulating	cross-shareholdings	is	to	require	companies	to	disclose	 the	 level	 of	 cross-shareholdings	 in	 their	 company.	 Some	 Japanese	companies	 have	 started	 making	 such	 disclosures	 in	 their	 annual	 reports.56	Unless	 there	 is	a	benefit	 in	doing	so,	however,	 companies	are	unlikely	 to	make	such	a	disclosure.57			Cross-shareholding	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 legal	 questions	 about	 institutional	 and	corporate	 shareholders’	 fiduciary	 duty	 to	 their	 own	 respective	 shareholders.58	First,	 by	 not	 selling	 their	 holdings	 to	 the	 bidder	 to	 maximise	 their	 monetary	returns,	boards	may	be	in	breach	of	the	fiduciary	duty	owed	to	their	companies	and	shareholders.	Such	a	breach	is	more	evident	when	companies	incur	losses	or	when	 they	 need	 to	 improve	 their	 cash	 flow.	 With	 such	 a	 legal	 duty	 and	 the	bursting	 of	 the	 economic	 bubble	 in	 the	 mid-1990s,	 companies	 have	 been	prompted	to	sell	their	cross-holdings—reducing	them	to	30	per	cent.	For	banks’	cross-shareholdings,	 there	 has	 also	 been	 a	 decline	 from	30	 per	 cent	 to	 12	 per	cent	since	the	beginning	of	the	1990s.	This	decrease	has	been	partly	attributed	to	the	 requirement	 that	 banks	 increase	 their	 capital	 ratio,	 which	 led	 banks	 to	dispose	of	their	much-devalued	shares	held	in	companies.			
	
4.2	Increasing	hedge	fund	activities		
	The	increase	in	private	equity	funds	in	Japan	has	coincided	with	a	decrease	in	the	level	 of	 corporate	 cross-shareholdings.	 Private	 equity	 funds	 see	 Japan	 as	 a	lucrative	market	for	the	undervalued	stocks	of	Japanese	companies.	A	number	of	shareholder	activist	strategies	have	been	used	to	create	returns	on	 investment.	The	common	investment	strategies	used	include	demands	for	boards	to	increase	dividends,	 requests	 to	 buy	 back	 shares,	 and	 putting	 pressure	 on	 the	 board	 to	dispose	 of	 under-performing	 assets.	 These	 strategies	may	 have	 contributed	 to	the	 acceleration	 in	 companies’	 disposal	 of	 cross-shareholdings	 as	 illiquid	 and	non-preforming	assets.59	The	realisation	of	the	gains	resulting	from	the	disposal	of	 these	 assets	 can	 be	 used	 to	 fund	 dividend	 distributions	 or	 to	 finance	 share	buyback	programmes	 to	 increase	 shareholder	 returns.	These	actions	 also	have	the	effect	of	reducing	a	company’s	cash	reserves,	which	has	been	said	to	create	a	disincentive	for	companies	to	change	their	governance	structure.	In	the	takeover	context,	a	private	equity	fund	can	use	a	takeover	bid	to	obtain	benefits	from	the	board	as,	for	example,	in	the	greenmail	strategy.	In	the	Bull-Dog	Sauce	case,	Steel	Partners	submitted	a	takeover	bid	and	then	faced	the	board’s	defence	of	a	poison	pill.	Steel	Partners	was	then	excluded	from	the	new	issuance	of	shares	under	the																																																									56	For	 instance,	 Eisai	 Co.,	 Ltd,	 a	 Japanese	 pharmaceutical	 company,	 has	 disclosed	 the	 level	 of	cross-shareholding	in	their	annual	report.	http://www.eisai.com/pdf/eannual/epdf2014an.pdf	57	The	EU	Directive	on	Takeover	Bid	requires	the	disclosure	of	some	cross-shareholdings.	Article	10(1)(c)of	Directive	2004/25EC	(Directive	on	takeover	bids).		58	Recent	 case	 law,	 however,	 has	 referred	 to	 the	 directors’	 duty	 to	 shareholders.	 Rex	 Holding	case,	1301	Kinyû	Shôji	Hanrei	28	(Tokyo	High	Court,	September	12,	2008);	Sunstar	case,	1326	Kinyû	Shôji	Hanrei	20	(Osaka	High	Court,	September	1,	2009).	59	Hideaki	 Sakawa,	 Masato	 Ubukata,	 Naoki	 Watanabe	 ‘Market	 liquidity	 and	 bank-dominated	corporate	governance:	Evidence	from	Japan’	(2014)	31(2)	International	Review	of	Economics	&	Finance	1-11.		
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defensive	 rights	 plan,	 but	 it	 received	 a	 compensatory	 payment	 in	 lieu	 of	 the	newly	issued	shares	from	the	company.	The	payment	was	upheld	by	the	court	as	legal,	 and	 the	 payment	 also	 justified	 the	 discriminatory	 treatment	 of	 Steel	Partners	by	the	company.	The	fate	of	private	equity	funds	in	Japan	will	depend	on	 them	 finding	 continuing	 funding	 sources.	 Leveraged	 buyouts	 (LBO)	 will	remain	 low	 in	 Japan,	 especially	 if	 the	 buyouts	 are	 hostile,	 because	 banks	 in	Japan—both	 domestic	 and	 foreign—will	 not	 finance	 hostile	 LBOs	 for	 fear	 of	reputational	 damage.60	Because	 the	 profit	 margins	 of	 banks	 remain	 low,	 the	bargaining	power	 rests	with	 the	borrower.	 If	 a	 bank	provides	 a	bridge	 loan	 to	finance	a	hostile	LBO,	it	will	lose	other	lending	business	with	the	target	company	and	its	associated	companies,	i.e.	subsidiaries.61		
	
	
5.	 Increased	corporate	governance	as	another	possible	 ‘breakthrough’	 for	
takeovers		
	
5.1	Independent	board			Independent	directors	play	a	role	in	managing	the	board’s	conflicts	of	interest	by	reducing	the	transaction	costs	in	a	takeover.62	Such	conflicts	can	arise	in	several	ways.	 For	 instance,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 may	 leak	 information	 about	 an	immature	takeover	negotiation	to	thwart	a	potential	takeover	threat.	It	can	issue	a	negative	 opinion	 about	 a	 bid	 or	 recommend	a	bid	 that	would	mainly	benefit	certain	directors	and	major	shareholders.	It	can	make	a	request	about	a	bidder’s	business	plan	with	the	aim	of	increasing	the	bidder’s	cost.	Independent	directors	can	 ensure	 that	 these	 measures	 are	 not	 taken	 as	 a	 way	 for	 the	 directors	 to	entrench	their	position.	The	process	of	obtaining	competent	independent	advice	to	 form	 the	board’s	 opinion	 about	 a	 bid	 can	be	monitored	by	 the	 independent	directors.	 The	 UK	 Corporate	 Governance	 Code	 recommends	 that	 independent	directors	 do	 not	 carry	 out	 executive	 functions	 or	 maintain	 direct	 connections	with	 the	 company,	 for	 instance,	 by	 being	 major	 shareholders	 or	 shareholder	representatives	 to	 the	 company.	 In	 Japan,	 there	 is	 a	 statutory	 requirement	 to	have	 at	 least	 one	 independent	 director	 on	 the	 board.63	This	 requirement	operates	 on	 a	 ‘comply	 or	 explain’	 basis.	 In	 June	 2015,	 a	 new	 Corporate	Governance	Code	came	into	force	which	requires	two	independent	directors	for	listed	 companies64.	 Compared	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 UK	 Corporate																																																									60	Kenji	Kutsyna,	Janet	Smith,	&	Richard	Smith	‘Banking	relationships	and	access	to	equity	capital	markets:	Evidence	 from	 Japan’s	main	bank	system’	 (2007)	31(2)	 Journal	of	Banking	&	Finance	335-360.		61	Ayoko	 Yasuda	 ‘Do	 bank	 relationships	 affect	 the	 firm’s	 underwriter	 choice	 in	 the	 corporate-bond	underwriting	market?’	(2005)	60	The	Journal	of	Finance	1259-1292.		62	Yoshiro	Miwa	and	Mark	Ramseyer	‘Who	appoints	them,	what	do	they	do?	Evidence	on	outside	directors	from	Japan’	(2005)	14(2)	Journal	of	Economics	&	Management	Strategy	299-337.		63	The	Japanese	Companies	Act	Article	2(15).	It	defines	an	independent	director	as	a	person	(1)	who	is	not	an	executive	director	nor	an	executive	officer,	nor	an	employee,	including	a	manager,	of	such	Stock	Company	or	any	of	its	subsidiaries,	and	(2)	who	has	neither	ever	served	in	the	past	as	an	executive	director	nor	executive	officer,	nor	as	an	employee,	including	a	manager,	of	such	Stock	Company	or	any	of	its	subsidiaries.		64 	Japan’s	 Corporate	 Governance	 Code,	 Principle	 4-8	http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/corporategovernance/20150306-1/01.pdf	
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Governance	Code,	 it	 is	questionable	whether	 two	 independent	directors	on	 the	board	can	effectively	control	 the	conflicts	of	 interest	of	 the	other	executives	on	the	 board.	 In	 fact,	 the	 independent	 director	 is	 an	 anomaly	 to	 the	 collective	culture	 of	 the	 Japanese	 board.	 An	 appointed,	 independent	 outsider	 would	 be	required	to	carry	out	executive	functions	and	perform	an	‘advisory’	duty	rather	than	 a	 ‘monitoring’	 one.	 Stemming	 from	 the	 recent	 2008	 financial	 crisis,	 the	independent	director	 in	UK-listed	companies	 is	expected	 to	be	 in	charge	of	 the	company’s	risk	management	by	holding	back	the	executive	directors’	egos,	which	can	lead	to	excessive	risk	taking.	Such	risk	management	can	also	take	place	in	the	remuneration	 committee,	 in	 which	 the	 independent	 directors	 design	 an	appropriate	model	for	executive	pay.			Whether	such	control	of	pay	is	an	effective	method	of	risk	management,	and	is	in	a	company’s	best	interest	in	the	long	term,	is	questionable.	The	UK	and	the	West	are	 at	 one	 end	 and	 Japan	 is	 at	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum.	 The	 prolonged	deflationary	economy	in	Japan	is	a	cause	of	Japan’s	risk-averse	culture.	Not	only	do	Japanese	boards	not	take	excessive	risks,	they	do	not	take	what	may	appear	to	many	Western	executives	to	be	reasonable	risks.	This	risk-averse	culture	can	be	attributed	 to	 the	 life-long	employment	model	 in	 Japanese	companies.	Directors	are	promoted	through	the	ranks	of	employees.	Chairman	of	the	board	is	often	a	post	 for	 the	 company’s	 retired	 CEO.	 The	 CEO	 and	 the	 directors	 do	 not	 risk	changing	the	corporate	roadmap	simply	to	drive	up	the	share	price.	By	contrast,	share	price	management	is	an	important	measure	of	directors’	success	in	the	UK	and	the	West.	UK	and	Western	company	directors	are	asked	by	shareholders	to	resign	 for	 poor	 performance.	 Japanese	 boards	 do	 not	 face	 the	 same	 pressure	regarding	 share	 performance,	 and	 the	 directors	 are	 under	 no	 legal	 and	moral	obligation	to	resign.	In	this	way,	the	government	hopes	to	increase	the	influence	of	 independent	outside	directors	 in	acting	as	catalysts	 to	encourage	more	risk-taking.	Independent	directors	should	not	be	employees	of	subsidiary	companies	or	 cross-held	 companies.	 They	 are	 not	 supposed	 to	 monitor	 or	 supervise	 the	board	but	should	bring	their	particular	management	skills	to	increase	corporate	performance.	 However,	 Japan	 does	 not	 have	 a	 large	 pool	 of	 professional	executives	who	normally	move	from	one	company	to	another	for	short	periods.65	The	 likelihood	 is	 that	 more	 foreign	 directors	 will	 take	 independent	 director	positions.			The	 appointment	 of	 independent	 directors	 and	 their	 increased	 number	 in	 a	company	can	reduce	conflicts	of	interest	stemming	from	cross-shareholding	and	rebalance	 the	 power	 given	 to	 executive	 directors	 that	 is	 reinforced	 by	 cross-shareholding.	 In	 a	 takeover,	 the	 independent	 directors,	 who	 have	 access	 to	information	about	the	company’s	cross-shareholdings,	are	in	a	better	position	to	identify	 the	 interests	of	minority	 shareholders.	They	may	be	more	objective	 in	assessing	the	company’s	future	prospects	when	their	interest	does	not	lie	in	the	hope	of	being	appointed	as	the	next	CEO	or	Chairman	of	the	board.	Not	only	can	they	 act	 as	 a	 channel	 between	 minority	 shareholders	 and	 management,	 by	actively	seeking	 independent	external	opinions,	 they	will	help	to	create	a	more																																																									65	The	CEO	of	Lawson	moving	to	Suntory	 is	a	rare	example;	Also	see	A	Horiuchi	and	K	Shimizu	‘Did	Amakudari	undermine	the	effectiveness	of	regulator	monitoring	in	Japan’	(2001)	25	Journal	of	Banking	and	Finance	573.	
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balanced	and	fair	board.	In	this	way,	the	board	can	issue	their	 ‘Opinion	Report’	based	on	a	more	independent	assessment.			
	
5.2	Shareholder	protection		
	
Individual	shareholders		
	What	is	most	lacking	in	Japanese	shareholder	protection	mechanisms	in	the	FIE	is	the	equivalent	of	mandatory	bids	in	the	UK	and	EU	that	provide	shareholders	an	equal	right	to	share	the	control	premium.	The	UK	mandatory	bid	requirement	benefits	minority	 shareholders	 and	 serves	 the	 interest	 of	 private	 equity	 firms’	business	models.	 As	 stated	 previously,	 Japanese	 shareholders	 tend	 to	 support	management.66	This	 symbiotic	 relationship	 is	 partly	 attributed	 to	 corporate	cross-shareholdings.	Individual	shareholders,	who	currently	own	18	per	cent	of	the	total	share	capital	listed	on	the	TSE,	are	supportive	of	management.	Many	of	them	 are	 former	 employees	 and	 customers	 of	 the	 companies.	 They	 strongly	identify	 with	 the	 companies,	 and	 therefore,	 their	 investments	 are	 not	 mostly	profit-driven	but	are	connected	to	their	sentiment	of	being	 included	within	the	corporate	community.	Their	investments	are	largely	relational.	Management	also	rewards	them	with	a	token	of	thanks	through	shareholder	discount	vouchers—shareholder	perks.67	These	vouchers	can	be	exchanged	at	kiosks	for	cash.	In	this	way,	 individual	 shareholders’	 sense	 of	 community	 with	 and	 loyalty	 to	 the	company,	thus	indirectly	supporting	management,	are	reinforced	through	these	shareholder	 perks.	 This	 explains	 why	 Bull-Dog	 Sauce,	 a	 household	 name,	received	overwhelming	shareholder	support	 for	management’s	defence	against	an	 unsolicited	 hostile	 bid	 by	 US	 Steel	 Partners,	 which	 offered	 a	 significant	premium	on	the	market	price.		
Institutional	shareholders			How	do	private	equity	firms	and	hedge	funds	that	seek	shorter	term	returns	on	their	investments	benefit	from	shareholder	protections?	Their	interest	would	be	better	served	in	a	takeover	if	the	UK	and	EU	types	of	mandatory	bid	requirement	were	 imposed	 at	 a	 lower	 level.	 Likewise,	 the	 Delaware	 type	 of	 shareholder	protection	could	also	provide	them	more	opportunities	to	realise	returns.	These	measures	 must	 be	 supported	 by	 stricter	 control	 of	 the	 non-frustration	 rule.	Shareholders	 associated	 through	 cross-shareholdings	 that	 create	 conflicts	 of	interest	with	management	 should	 also	 be	 controlled.	 This	 scenario	 is	 different	from	the	EU’s	shareholder	agreement	where	the	breakthrough	rule	is	required	to	momentarily	suspend	their	agreements	in	a	takeover—thus	freeing	shareholders	from	 these	 agreements	 regarding	 the	 exercise	 of	 their	 votes	 on	management’s	defence.	As	mentioned	previously,	cross-shareholding	in	Japan	does	not	create	a	legal	 relationship	 that	 directs	 shareholders	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 their	 votes.	 The	effect	 of	 not	 exercising	 their	 votes	 to	 support	 management	 results	 in	reputational	 damage,	 and	 retaliation	 by	 management	 and	 the	 network	 of																																																									66	Stephanie	 Pease,	 Stanley	 Paliwoda,	 Jim	 Slater	 ‘The	 erosion	 of	 stable	 shareholder	 practice	 in	Japan’	(2006)	15	International	Business	Review	618-640.		67	B	McLannahan	‘Japanese	shareholders	reap	quirky	perks’	Financial	Times	23	Feb	2014.		
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companies	 would	 result	 in	 reciprocal	 withdrawals	 of	 support.	 Therefore,	 one	way	of	protecting	minority	shareholders	could	be	to	require	the	votes	of	cross-held	shares	to	be	disclosed	and,	in	extreme	cases,	discounted.			With	regard	 to	shareholder	perks,	 the	amount	distributed	should	be	subject	 to	income	 tax	 to	 avoid	 a	 disguised	 distribution	 of	 dividends.	 As	 dividends	 by	Japanese	 companies	 are	 below	 the	 European	 average,	 restricting	 these	 perks	could	 increase	 individual	 shareholders’	 efforts	 to	 pursue	 a	 return	 on	 their	investment.68			
	
6.	Forecasting	Japan’s	market	for	corporate	control				As	 stated	 above,	 Japan	 has	 an	 active	 market	 for	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions.	Compared	 with	 other	 advanced	 economies,	 it	 also	 has	 an	 active	 market	 for	corporate	control	as	measured	by	the	number	of	takeover	bids	per	year-	yet	the	number	of	hostile	 takeovers	 remains	very	 low.	However,	bringing	 Japan	 to	 the	level	of	the	UK	and	US	markets,	where	there	are	a	greater	number	of	successful	unsolicited	takeover	bids,	will	depend	not	on	changes	in	its	existing	FIE	to	align	with	 UK	 and	 EU	 laws,	 but	 on	 structural	 changes	 by	 decreasing	 cross-shareholding.69	Independent	 directors	 can	 also	 bring	 changes	 to	 the	 symbiotic	relationships	 between	 management	 and	 shareholders.	 An	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	 independent	directors	and	an	 increase	 in	 their	supervisory	 function	could	 put	 more	 pressure	 on	 management	 to	 focus	 on	 investor	 returns.	 This	approach	could	force	management	to	dispose	of	undervalued	and	illiquid	cross-held	 stocks.	 However,	 the	 real	 pressure	 for	 change	 will	 have	 to	 come	 from	economic	 pressure.	 Economic	 pressure	 can	 lead	 to	 more	 radical	 structural	changes.	 Nevertheless,	 Japanese	 companies	 can	 find	 ways	 to	 continue	 their	growth	 by	 avoiding	 structural	 changes.	 The	 Bank	 of	 Japan	 can	 devalue	 its	currency	 to	 attempt	 to	 create	 an	 export-led	 recovery	 of	 Japan’s	 economy,	 as	recently	happened.70	Japanese	companies	can	also	acquire	profit-making	foreign	entities	to	boost	their	overall	growth,	which	explains	why	there	have	been	more	in-out	buyouts	by	Japanese	companies.	Many	Japanese	companies	and	banks	are	also	financially	strong,71	and	even	if	a	particular	entity	within	a	corporate	group	is	operating	at	a	loss,	it	will	not	trigger	an	unsolicited	hostile	takeover.			
	
																																																									68	Aoki	Yasuharu	‘How	does	the	largest	shareholder	affect	dividends’	(2014)	14(4)	International	Review	 Finance	 613-645.	 In	 Japan,	 the	 corporation-owned	 companies	 tend	 to	 have	 lower	dividends.		69	T	Pempel	‘Structural	gaiatsu:	International	Finance	and	Political	Change	in	Japan’	(1999)	32(8)	Comparative	 Political	 Studies	 907-932;	 Glenn	 Morgan	 and	 Izumi	 Kubo	 ‘Beyond	 path	dependency?	 Constructing	 new	models	 for	 institutional	 change:	 the	 case	 of	 capital	markets	 in	Japan’	(2005)	3	Socio-Economic	Review	55-82.		70	TF	Cargill,	MM	Hutchison	and	Ito	Takatoshi	Financial	Policy	and	Central	Bamking	in	Japan	(MIT	Cambridge	2000).		71	Qi	Luo,	Toyohiko	Hachiya,	 ‘Corporate	governance,	cash	holdings,	and	 firm	value’	 (2005)	8(4)	Review	of	Pacific	Basin	Financial	Markets	and	Policies	613-636.		
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7.	Conclusion	
	The	 perceived	 low	 level	 of	 activity	 in	 the	 Japanese	 takeover	market	 cannot	 be	attributed	 to	 its	 takeover	 law,	 the	 Financial	 Instrument	 or	 the	 Exchange	 Law.	Indeed,	 a	 careful	 examination	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 law	 reveals	 that	 this	legislation	 operates	 in	 the	 offeror’s	 favour.	 In	 contrast	 with	 the	 UK	 Takeover	Code	and	the	EU	Takeover	Directive,	there	is	no	evidence	that	Japanese	takeover	law	 imposes	more	 burdens	 on	 the	 unsolicited	 offeror.	 Yet	 there	 are	 structural	defences,	notably	cross-shareholdings,	 that	can	frustrate	an	unsolicited	bid	and	which	cannot	be	removed	by	an	EU-style	breakthrough	rule.	The	relationship	of	individual	 shareholders	 with	 the	 management	 is	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	distribution	 of	 un-taxed	 shareholder	 perks	 and	 this	 helps	 to	 explain	 why	individual	 shareholders	 tend	 to	 support	 the	 incumbent	 management.	 The	conclusion	is	that	seeking	a	convergence	of	Japanese	takeover	law	with	those	of	the	 UK	 and	 EU	 would	 not	 remove	 the	 barriers	 to	 an	 increased	 number	 of	successful	 unsolicited	 bids	 in	 the	 Japanese	 takeover	 market.	 The	 general	corporate	governance	norms	relating	to	independent	directors	and	shareholder	protection,	 if	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 the	 conflicts	 stemming	 from	 the	 cross-shareholdings,	 can	 potentially	 break	 through	 the	 Japanese	 corporate	 control	structure.	 However,	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 these	 norms	 will	 depend	 on	 whether	their	 intended	 purpose	 is	 properly	 understood	 and	 whether	 shareholders	 see	the	 benefits	 of	 their	 enforcement.	 While	 the	 government	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	carrying	 out	 reform	 measures	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 cross-shareholdings,	 it	 is	unlikely	 that	 government	 action	 by	 itself	 will	 be	 enough	 to	 increase	competitiveness.	 And	 despite	 recent	 government	 action,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	that	reducing	cross-shareholdings	as	a	barrier	to	takeovers	is	a	high	priority	on	the	government’s	reform	agenda.				 		
